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THE PRIVATE BAR - UNTAPPED RESERVOIR
OF CONSUMER POWER
Joseph D. Tydings*
As the decade of the 1970's begins, the political focus of Americans has in-
creasingly centered on our domestic problems. New areas have emerged as
cause for critical concern. In this "new" probe into our society's internal prob-
lems we have discovered that individuals are increasingly being overwhelmed
by forces beyond their direct control. One of the most obvious areas of con-
cern is the quality of the environment, where poisonous air, putrid water, and
despoiled landscapes face the helpless citizen who views with alarm the destruc-
tion of our natural resources. Recently we have come to recognize that this
situation is so damaging and threatening that our very existence is at stake.
The legislative and executive branches have committed themselves, at least in
speeches, to sweeping remedial action designed to restore the quality of our en-
vironment. Hopefully, action will follow words.
But there is a second area that deserves just as much concern and atten-
tion as the environment: the cause of the consumer. This is a broad field that
encompasses many problems from advertising fraud, repair deficiencies, and oil
import quotas to planned obsolescence, court reform, and unconscionable credit
practices. The list is without limit. The stakes are tremendous; consumer fraud
and shoddy goods alone may cause losses to the American public in excess of
$10 billion a year. And this figure does not include the indirect costs to con-
sumers of artificial price support programs or goods designed for high repair
costs.
Here, as in pollution, the individual faces institutions and practices that
he cannot begin to influence or remedy. Indeed, not only is the consumer unable
to correct evil practices or poor production methods but also he usually stands
little chance of recovering his own losses from fraud or deception. The consumer
is helpless when faced with distant corporate or government decisions, when
confronted with restrictive laws and hostile courts, and when opposed by a
battery of highly-paid lawyers.
For those who have explored this issue with concern for the consumer,
it has become obvious that we must redress the balance between the hapless
buyer and the indifferent business. If not, there will be no justice in the market-
place. Laws, trade customs, regulations, and institutions developed for our
economy at the turn of the century by the Progressives are now hopelessly in-
adequate for the task of policing today's world of mass marketing and com-
puterized industry. Nothing stands out as more eloquent testimony to the failure
of outmoded attempts to aid the consumer than the Federal Trade Commission,
a seemingly inert and lifeless bureaucracy long since exhausted of strength or
initiative.
What we need is a redress in the imbalance of power between the buyer
* United States Senator from Maryland. Portions of this article have been previously
published and appear here with permission. Tydings, Fair Play for Consumers, TRIAL, Feb.,
1970, at 37.
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and the seller. This can be done - and ought be done - beginning with two
distinct yet complementary approaches. First, the consumer needs an advocate
at the federal level. There is no one who exclusively represents the individual
buyer in the councils of government or in the Byzantine maze of the federal
bureaucracy. Only when there is someone whose responsibility is to fight, lobby,
publicize, and sue for the consumer will our ossified institutions respond to the
needs of the individual buyer. Second, the consumer must be given an ade-
quate private remedy in court. No administrative agency can possibly guard
the rights of millions of individual consumers or process the thousands of com-
plaints that would be received each year. Each buyer is best protected by him-
self. Once he has a reasonable chance of recovering his damages, a court of
law will be the most direct, efficient, and certain mode of redressing wrongs
in the marketplace.
Both of these approaches are required for the consumer - a remedy in
court for individual wrongs and an advocate at the highest levels of government
to influence national policy. I introduced legislation last session that would
serve the consumer in these ways. On April 25, 1969, I introduced the con-
sumer class action bill (S. 1980)' and on May 1, 1969, I introduced the Con-
sumer Affairs Act of 1969 (S. 2045)2 providing for an Office of Consumer
Affairs in the Executive Office of the President. Other senators have intro-
duced bills in these areas, some similar and others quite different.
The executive has also drafted legislation on these two specific subjects.
On December 3, the Administration submitted S. 3201, providing for consumer
class actions; and on December 12, the Administration introduced S. 3240, its bill
creating an Office of Consumer Affairs.4 As a strong proponent of consumer
legislation, I welcomed this commitment by the Administration, for the Admin-
istration has repeatedly said that it means to act vigorously and effectively to
protect the consumer. But if one looks beyond the rhetoric of the President's
spokesmen and examines the proposed legislation in detail, it can be judged only
as a dismal failure. In the words of Bess Myerson Grant, the head of the New
York City Consumer Affairs Division: "The administration's so-called class
action bill is like balloon bread. Substantial at first glance but sort [sic] on
weight."5 She went on to say that it is in essence "a fraud" and that it is
not the product of the President's valiant special assistant for con-
sumer affairs, Mrs. Virginia Knauer.
The administration bill is the product of White House assistants -
and by the look of the legislation they have drafted, these are assistants
whose primary concern is ... not the interests of the consumer.
The single most disingenuous provision in the administration bill is its
prerequisite of a Justice Department or FTC action before a class suit
1 115 CONG. REc. S4119 (daily ed. April 25, 1969). See id. at S4163-64 (remarks of
Senator Tydings).
2 115 CONG. REc. S4477 (daily ed. May 1, 1969). See id. at S4497-98 (remarks of Sen-
ator Tydings).
3 115 CoNG. Rnc. S15441 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1969). See id. at S15445-47 (remarks of
Senator Magnuson).
4 115 CONG. REc. S16569 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 1969). See id. at S16557-60 (remarks of
Senator Javits).
5 The Washington Post, Feb. 6, 1970, at Bl, col. 7
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may be brought. What assurance would consumers have that these agencies
would have sufficient funding or personnel to prosecute the many thou-
sands of instances of systematic consumer abuse which occur every year?
The 11 categories of wrongs to which the administration bill is ad-
dressed boil down in reality to only two categories - misrepresentation
and failure to return deposits for goods not delivered. 6
She said that failure to make good on guarantees, "unconscionable con-
tracts," such as those in which a buyer is promised a discount if he persuades
another person to make a purchase, and installment sales were subjects that had
been overlooked.
The Administration's legislative promise of grand schemes is betrayed in
the reality of fine print. Its legislation is the product of the politics of public
relations; it is not written by those who are serious about the continuing abuses
in the marketplace. Indeed, if we compare the elaborate promises of this
Administration against the delivered product - its legislation - it appears that
the American public is the victim of a consumer fraud. The consumer was
promised protection, and he has received from the Administration only artifice.
I do not make these charges lightly; I shall document them. In order to
understand the grave deficiencies of the Administration proposals, it is essential
to present some background and to discuss the bills in detail.
The presence of nominal consumer agencies in the government and the
present legal structure do not provide the consumer with an individual, private
remedy that is at all adequate. For most of Anglo-American legal history, the
law has coldly insisted: "Caveat emptor - the buyer beware." This was all
very well when one was selling a cow to his neighbor and the man had a
chance to look the animal over, but in today's marketplace, with sophisticated
Madison Avenue techniques, whatever justification there may have been for
such an unyielding policy no longer exists. Its chief effect in today's complex
market is to place an undue burden on the contractual party least able to bear it.
Too often the modem consumer is unable to assess the technical qualities of
the product he purchases, to resist sophisticated sales campaigns, or to compre-
hend the multitude of credit plans and financial "deals" that he may be offered.
Every year billions of dollars are wasted by consumers through the purchase of
misrepresented merchandise. Although the least educated and more impover-
ished segments of society suffer most, all levels of society are affected. Com-
missioner Mary Gardiner Jones of the Federal Trade Commission characterized
the situation this way: "No matter how informed and sophisticated the con-
sumer, deception will take its toll and the very morality of the community is
at stake when there is no effective legal action to be taken against such dis-
honest merchants."7
Public awareness of the need for consumer protection programs has had
some salutary effects but has not resulted in a significant reduction in the
incidence of fraud. False advertisers, loan sharks, and others of their ilk are
still making exorbitant profits at the expense of the unwary consumer.
Despite good intentions and the proliferation of consumer protection laws
6 Id.
7 W. MAGNUSON & J. CARPzR, TE DARK SIDE OF THE MARxETPLACE 59 (1968).
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and agencies, our society continues to require that "the buyer beware." The
activities of the Federal Trade Commission indicate the weaknesses of the pres-
ent "agency" approach to the prevention of consumer frauds. Indeed, even
Commissioner Elman of the FTC recently charged that this agency is marked
by "waste, inefficiency, and indifference to public interest.""
The lengthy career of the Holland Furnace Co. pr6vides a classic example
of the ineffectiveness of administrative agencies in providing consumer remedies.
Complaints about high-pressure tactics were made against the company as long
ago as the early 1930s.' In December of 1936 the company agreed to a Federal
Trade Commission consent order against certain misleading advertising claims."0
Although complaints against the company continued,"- a second proceeding was
not initiated by the Federal Trade Commission until 1954.12 Four years later,
a cease and desist order was issued prohibiting Holland "from engaging in a
sales scheme.., whereby its salesmen gain access to homes by misrepresenting
themselves as official 'inspectors' and 'heating engineers' and thereafter dis-
mantling furnaces on the pretext that this is necessary to determine the extent
of necessary repairs."1
This occurred not in 1930 or 1940. This occurred in 1958. For seven years
Holland Furnace Co. ignored the court decree enforcing the cease and desist
order. Finally, in 1965, the company was heavily fined for contempt of court 4
Consumer fraud is too widespread to be effectively policed by any one
agency. By their very nature consumer protection agencies must select for action
only the most blatant forms of fraud and only those operating on a large enough
scale to justify the expenditure of agency time. Delay is inherent in a bureaucracy,
administrative budgets and personnel are limited, and in some cases the statutory
structure of powers of an agency may inhibit its effectiveness. More often than
not, consumer agencies lack effective sanctions to enforce their decrees. 5
It is clear that present agency remedies might as well be nonexistent. Just
as important, the Office of Consumer Affairs that I propose will not remedy
the problem by itself. This office can affect policy, it can litigate major cases, and
it can attack flagrant and widespread practices. But no agency or agencies
in Washington will provide enough protection for the defrauded consumer. We
must provide a legal remedy that the individual can use immediately and effec-
tively. The injured party has the incentive to carry through; he is the best
guardian of his own interest. We thus must use a traditional American tool:
the private lawsuit.
Today, of course, a victimized consumer may initiate a private action for
fraud or for recission of a sales contract on the basis of misrepresentation. In
8 The Washington Post, Sept. 11, 1969, at A2, cols. 1-2.
9 48 CONSUMER BULL., April, 1965, at 25.
10 In re Holland Furnace Co., 24 FTC 1413-14 (1936).
11 48 CONSUMER BULL., April, 1965, at 25-26.
12 In re Holland Furnace Co., 55 FTC 55 (1958), aff'd, 295 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1961).
13 Id. at 91.
14 In re Holland Furnace Co., 341 F.2d 548 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 924 (1965).
15 But cf. Dixon, Federal-State Cooperation to Combat Unfair Trade Practices, 39 ST. Gov'r
37 (1966); Mindell, N.Y. Bureau of Consumer Frauds and Protection-A Review of Its Con-
sumer Protection Activities, 11 N.Y.L.F. 603 (1965); O'Connell, Consumer Protection in the
State of Washington, 39 ST. GOVT 37 (1966); Rice, Remedies, Enforcement Procedures and
the Duality of Consumer Transaction Problems, 48 B.U.L. Rav. 559 (1968).
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most cases, however, this remedy is more theoretical than real. Lawsuits are
costly. The financial loss to a single consumer is not usually large enough to
make individual litigation practicable. His court costs and attorney's fees may
far exceed the judgment he is likely to receive if he prevails in his suit.
But while administrative agencies may have limited effectiveness with in-
dividual cases, and while the cost of an individual suit may be prohibitive, many
persons acting as a class could afford to enforce their individual rights.16 A con-
sumer class action compensates for the inability of individual consumers to
litigate small individual losses by enabling one or more representatives of a group
of consumers with similar injuries to place the group injury in issue. The ag-
gregate group claim is generally large enough to warrant the necessary expenses
and, more significantly, to make it possible to obtain private counsel on reason-
able terms.
In addition to being economically infeasible, individual suits, even if their
success is assumed, are unlikely to prove an effective deterrent to the dishonest
company. In fact, many irresponsible companies probably treat the loss of an
occasional small judgment as an ordinary risk of the trade - a risk offset by high
profits obtained through misrepresentation or other deceit.
The consumer class action, in contrast, has beneficial effects that extend
beyond the recovery of individual damages for the injured consumers. The mere
existence of an effective class action remedy will deter improper conduct. The
potential defendant is forced to consider not only the possible direct economic
loss from a class action, but also the potential visibility, publicity, public re-
action, and resulting loss of good will. 7 Although the dishonest merchant may
be able to safely ignore the separate complaints of many individuals, he cannot
afford to disregard the public criticism of many voices raised in unison.
Experience in progressive states where the courts are amenable to con-
sumer class actions reveals the potential protection for consumer rights that
this procedural device can provide. In a recent case from the Supreme Court of
California, for example, a taxicab customer was permitted to maintain a class
action on behalf of himself and others similarly situated to recover allegedly ex-
cessive fares charged by a Los Angeles taxicab company over a period of four
years.' The court ruled that the action could properly be brought as a class
action since the complaint showed the existence of an ascertainable class as well
as a defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact affecting the
parties to be represented. Although the individual members of the class would
have had claims that were relatively insignificant, the aggregate claim of over
$100,000 made litigation feasible. The court, recognizing this fact, stated:
[A]bsent a class suit, recovery by any of the individual taxicab users
is unlikely. The complaint alleges that there is a relatively small loss to
each individual class member. In such a case separate actions would be
economically infeasible. Joinder of plaintiffs would be virtually impossible
in this case. It is more likely that, absent a class suit, defendant will retain
16 See Dole, Consumer Class Actions Under Recent Consumer Credit Legislation, 44
N.Y.U.L. REv. 80 (1969); Staars, The Consumer Class Action, 49 B.U.L. Rv. 211 (1969).,
17 See Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 485-88 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Dole, Consumer
Class Actions Under the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 1968 DUKE L.J. 1101, 1103.
18 Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967).
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the benefits from its alleged wrongs. A procedure that would permit the
allegedly injured parties to recover the amount of their overpayments is
to be preferred over the foregoing alternative.19 (Footnotes omitted.)
As the California Supreme Court has recognized, class actions are
among the most potent of the weapons in the consumer's arsenal. But the class
action procedure in many states is outmoded and archaic. While all states
provide some form of class action, the manner in which the procedure is usually
defined and limited often makes it unavailable in the typical consumer fraud
situation. The New York cases, for example, require a unity of interest among
the members of a class that approximates the test for compulsory joinder of
parties.20 New York also requires that class members desire identical remedies.2
Moreover, as a result of the recent Supreme Court decision in Snyder v.
Harris, 2 the federal courts appear to be even less hospitable to consumer class
actions than state courts. Prior to Snyder the provisions of rule 23 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure appeared to establish a procedural basis for the
maintenance of consumer class actions in those cases where a basis for federal
jurisdiction existed. 23 But in that decision the Supreme Court ruled that separate
and distinct claims cannot be aggregated to meet the required $10,000 juris-
dictional amount. This ruling in effect makes the rule 23 action, the most
modern class action procedure in the United States, unavailable to the de-
frauded consumer who has a claim of less than $10,000, even if he can satisfy
the necessary diversity or federal question requirement for jurisdiction. The
case thus effectively precludes recourse to the federal courts in consumer class
actions.
It was because of this legal situation and the obvious need for vigorous
action in the consumer field that I introduced S. 1980 last spring. Congressman
Bob Eckhardt, with whom I have worked closely, introduced a companion bill in
the House.sa S. 1980 would provide for consumer class actions in federal court
where state or federal consumer protection laws have been violated. The bill was
designed to reverse the effects of Snyder and, in addition, to broaden the basis for
federal jurisdiction over consumer fraud. By doing so, it would make available
the liberal machinery of federal rule 23 for classes of persons bilked in situations
involving deception, fraud, or other illegal overreaching.
In July, the Senate Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Ma-
chinery, of which I am chairman, held hearings to consider the merits of S. 1980.
Testimony was heard from, among others, Ralph Nader; Virginia Knauer,
Special Assistant to the President for Consumer Affairs; and Bess Myerson Grant,
19 Id. at -, 433 P.2d at 746, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 738; accord, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
391 F.2d 555, 563 (2d Cir. 1968).
20 E.g., Society Milion Athena, Inc. v. National Bank, 281 N.Y. 282, 22 N.E.2d 374(1939); Brenner v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 276 N.Y. 230, 11 N.E.2d 890 (1937).
21 E.g., Gaynor v. Rockefeller, 15 N.Y.2d 120, 204 N.E.2d 627, 256 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1965).
Prior to 1966, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure required that a common remedy be sought
by all members of a class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (3), 308 U.S. 689 (1938). This is no longer
required in the federal system. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
22 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
23 See Donelan, Prerequisites to a Class Action Under New Rule 23, 10 B.C.. IND. & CoM.
L. REv. 527 (1969); Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HAv. L. Rav. 356, 375-400 (1967).
23a H.R. 11656, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
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Commissioner of the Department of Consumer Affairs for the City of New York
- all of whom supported the concept of increased consumer access to the class
action procedure in the federal courts.
In her testimony, Mrs. Knauer presented a somewhat different approach
than S. 1980, suggesting legislation to permit consumer class action suits for
the broad range of practices condemned as "unfair or deceptive" under the
Federal Trade Commission Act. After close study of Mrs. Knauer's proposal,
I concluded that it complemented the provisions of S. 1980. On October 29,
therefore, I introduced S. 309224 combining Mrs. Knauer's proposal with my
own. Congressman Eckhardt introduced similar legislation in the House.24"
Basically, S. 3092 confers upon federal courts (without regard to amount
or citizenship) jurisdiction to hear class suits based on acts in defraud of con-
sumers. An "act in defraud of consumers" is defined as including two dis-
tinct things: (1) "an unfair or deceptive act or practice which is unlawful
within the meaning of section 5 (a) (1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act,"
or (2) "an act that gives rise to a civil action by a consumer or consumers
under State, statutory or decisional law for the benefit of consumers."25
The federal court would apply state law in the consumer class action cases
exactly as state law is applied in a diversity of citizenship case.2" Thus, the court
in any suit would be dealing with a definite body of law in a manner in which it
is accustomed to deal with that law. Moreover, use of existing bodies of state law
and of Federal Trade Commission rulings prevents the coverage of the bill from
being "vague."
Perhaps the most significant provision of S. 3092 is section 4(d), which
governs the award of attorney's fees. If an action has been successful, the at-
torney will receive an award of a reasonable fee, based on the value of his
services to the class." I have become increasingly convinced that the private
bar is the untapped reservoir of consumer power. S. 3092 is designed to insure
the ready availability of competent, well-compensated counsel. By doing so,
it guarantees a major increase in legal muscle for the consumer. Significantly,
that muscle will be in the form of private legal actions, the traditional method
of effectively redressing grievances in this country.
By using traditional institutions and proven procedures we can attack this
problem of consumer fraud directly. We do not need elaborate new schemes;
we do not need massive governmental intervention; we need not regulate the
free market. All that is required is that we open the courts to this long-neglected
area.
Unfortunately, various pressures have induced the Administration to
retreat from the strong proposal originally advocated by Mrs. Knauer. The
bill that the President finally sent to Congress offered a sorry substitute for the
meaningful consumer protection that the American people had a right to expect.
Under the President's proposal a consumer cannot file a suit no matter
24 115 CONG. REc. S13426 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1969).
24a H.R. 14595, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
25 S. 3092, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a) (2) (1969).
26 Id. § 4(c).
27 Id. § 4(d).
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how outrageous the fraud may be. Under the Administration proposal, the
private remedy that is supposed to give every consumer the chance to have
his day in court is tied to governmental bureaucracy. Before the consumer can
file a suit, the Attorney General must have initiated and won a suit on behalf
of the government or the ETC must have fied a final cease and desist order.2"
Thus individual suits must depend upon the promptness and concern of the
Justice Department or FTC bureaucracy - both of which are far from being
consumer agencies. Under the Nixon kill, a consumer's right to his day in
court is more restricted than that of a treble damage plaintiff in an antitrust
action. Must we repeat the failures of the dormant FTC? What is the point
of giving the buyer an effective private action if it is made to depend upon
bureaucratic approval?
Just as disastrous for the consumer, both governmental and private suits
would be limited to a narrow series of defined forms of fraud - forms that
unscrupulous merchants can change as rapidly as legislation can be en-
acted. Under this severe limitation, the consumer will have fewer remedies than
he would in state courts. Why grant the consumer the advantage of the
federal procedure and then deny him the power of state substantive law? With
these two crippling limitations the consumer will be little better off than he is
today.
As noted earlier, no purely administrative change will solve the consumer's
problems; primary reliance must rest upon private initiative in the courts. But
a pure consumer agency, representing the consumer alone, can have profound
impact upon key government decisions, agency rulings, and court actions. At
present, no one represents the consumer in Washington; and even the class
action proposal will not remedy this particular lack of representation. We need
an Office of Consumer Affairs.
I am quite flattered that the Administration bill creating an Office of Con-
sumer Affairs (S. 3240) so closely follows my own bill (S. 2045) in so many
respects. I regret, however, that in several crucial areas the Administration pro-
posal differs from mine; these differences add up, in my opinion, to a virtual
emasculation of authority of the Office of Consumer Affairs and make this
reorganization more cosmetic than real.
In delegating functions to the Office of Consumer Affairs, the two bills
are very similar. Both measures provide for an office (1) to coordinate federal
action and programs affecting consumers; (2) to disseminate consumer infor-
mation; (3) to initiate and coordinate consumer research; (4) to aid efforts
at consumer education; (5) to assist state and local consumer efforts; (6) to
investigate and report on consumer affairs; and (7) to be the consumer "ad-
vocate" within the federal government. 9 Where the bills differ is in the powers
granted to the Office of Consumer Affairs.
In the area of consumer complaints, for example, my bill provides for a
consumer office that can investigate and then act." Under the Administration
28 S. 3201, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 204 (1969).
29 Compare S. 2045, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1969) with S. 3240, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. §
103 (1969).
30 S. 2045, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1969).
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plan, however, the office can do neither; it merely is a passive transmission belt
for consumer complaints to the appropriate agencies.-3
Under section 3(b) (2) of my bill, the Consumer Office will establish con-
sumer centers across the country to bring the federal consumer advocate within
reach of the consumer himself. The Administration makes no such proposal.
In section 5(b) of my bill there is a specific provision that, upon a com-
plaint, the Office of Consumer Affairs "shall take whatever action may be
appropriate to resolve the complaint.., including, but not limited to, referral
to an appropriate... agency." 2 In the Administration bill, all that the office
is permitted to do is "transmit" the complaint to the appropriate agency.
Washington already has enough people whose sole function is to refer unsolved
problems to other people. The entire point of an Office of Consumer Affairs is
to create an organization outside the existing bureaucracies to provide action
for the consumer; we must provide a federal advocate and representative for
the consumer who will face the bureaucracy. I cannot understand how an
organization that merely ferries consumer complaints to existing departments
and agencies will change the present situation at all.
Further, the full power of investigation is granted to the Consumer Office
under my bill so that a complete inquiry can be made following any complaint;13
this power is obviously necessary if any successful solution is to be provided by the
office for valid complaints. More important, the function of consumer advocate
requires the powers of investigation to discover whether individual complaints
reflect widespread practices that must be corrected.
Under my proposal, the Office of Consumer Affairs is granted a full battery
of discovery or investigative powers to be used for all purposes. Section 5(d)
utilizes the subpoena power for documents and witnesses, deposition authority,
and the contempt of court provisions of section 9 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act. In order to add punch to the eyes and ears of the consumer advo-
cate, I have added the penalty provisions of section 10 of the same Federal
Trade Commission Act, which contains stiff fines and jail sentences for willful
refusal or false statements.
In stark contrast to these broad powers of investigation, the Administration's
plan has discovery provisions that are drafted to practically blindfold the con-
sumer advocate. There are no investigatory powers that can be used for com-
plaints.
Indeed, the President's Office of Consumer Affairs itself has no investigatory
powers; rather these are vested in the Consumer Protection Division of the
Justice Department.14 Even the division's investigatory powers are limited to
general investigation. Thus under the Administration's bill there is the anomaly
of having the policy investigation power given to the prosecutors; the policy
body, the Office of Consumer Affairs, must proceed blindly. To compound this
ridiculous situation further, the power of investigation relating to actual court
cases or regulatory proceedings, that is, the prosecutor's investigatory power, is
31 S. 3240, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 104 (1969).
32 S. 2045, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(b) (1969).
33 Id. §§ 5(c)-(d).
34 S. 3240, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 204 (1969).
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given to the federal agency involved in the proceedings and not to the con-
sumer prosecutor.3 5 Thus, the Division of Consumer Protection under section
203 can intervene to present the consumer's case in court or before an agency -
presumably to present the consumer point of view -but under section 204 (a) (3)
the consumer lawyer has to rely on that very agency for discovery powers.
If the agency does not want to do anything, nothing happens. Two or
three secretaries could be set up right now in the White House to pass on com-
plaints to the agencies. Basically, that is what has been happening for the last
twenty or thirty years.
The authority for intervention on behalf of the consumer in regulatory
proceedings and appeals of those proceedings or in district courts and courts of
appeals is similar in both my bill and the Administration proposal - the dif-
ference in approach lies with the people given this authority. In S. 2045, this
power is given to the consumer advocate, the Office of Consumer Affairs.2
Thus an independent body whose only task is to represent the consumer is given
the power to do precisely that - represent the consumer. This guarantees that
a new point of view is injected into agency and court proceedings. At last
someone will speak for all the unrepresented consumers across the land.
The Administration divorces the power to intervene from the Office of
Consumer Affairs and puts it back into an ongoing bureaucracy - the Justice
Department. Those who are the policymakers cannot be the advocates. The
Justice Department advocates are, as I pointed out above, dependent upon the
agencies involved for any information gathering powers, so they have no in-
dependent source of information. Most distressing, the Justice Department also
may have the responsibility to defend the agency itself if it is in court.
Thus the very same department - albeit with different divisions - which
has the responsibility of bringing in the consumer perspective also has the
responsibility of presenting the agency perspective. I cannot imagine a greater
conflict of responsibilities in one department. It simply does not make sense
to create a new structure - the Office of Consumer Affairs - because an
independent view, a new perspective, must be created at the federal level and
then not permit that new structure to present its case. What is the point of a
consumer advocate if it cannot advocate?
At the federal level, many of the decisions that affect the consumer most
directly are not made in adversary proceedings before courts or agencies. Rather
they are made in the policy decisions of the departments, agencies, or high-
level committees. The need for the consumer advocate, a separate, new voice
in the higher councils of government, is the very reason for creating the Office
of Consumer Affairs and placing it in the President's executive office. We must
create a high-level, policy advocate for the consumer.
For this reason, my bill specifically provides for the intervention of the
Consumer Office as a matter of right when "any matter" is pending before an
agency or department that "may affect substantially the interests of consumers." '
35 Id. at 204(a) (3).
36 S. 2045, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1969).
37 Id. §4(d).
[Vol. 45:478]
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
Contrast this clear mandate for the Consumer Office to plead the case of the
consumer to the Administration's analogous provision, section 301."8
For instance, in the matter of import quotas of oil, a matter handled by
the Secretary of the Interior, we have a decision which, when the amount of oil
coming into this country is restricted, can raise the cost of living for the average
consumer by many dollars every year. Here is where the consumer ought to be
represented. Here is where a people's counsel, here is where a public defender,
here is where a consumer advocate ought to be in there fighting for the con-
sumer. There is no one in there now.
Under the President's proposal, the Office of Consumer Affairs is given
no authority to speak or intervene in any matter, through any bureaucratic
maze, to represent the consumer. The Division of Consumer Affairs in the
Department of Justice is given no authority to speak or intervene. There is no
institutional change. Departments and agencies are merely directed to "give
due consideration to the valid interests of consumers." '
Well, they are supposed to do that now, yet we know it is not happening.
To me, this directive is cruel deception. It is next to meaningless. Nothing can be
more inadequate for the consumer. It is a clear decision to do nothing at all.
I hope I have brought to light some of the grave inadequacies of the
Administration's proposals; no help to the complaining consumer; no indepen-
dent investigatory powers for the policymakers or advocates; no separate insti-
tution for consumer advocacy; and no representation in policymaking decisions.
It can only be concluded that the Administration's program is totally inadequate.
It is a promise without the possibility of fulfillment. It is the consumer advocate
blindfolded and tongue-tied.
Hard choices must be made about these measures, but the choices are
clear-cut. Either we have the appearance of relief for consumers and the illusion
of redress of fraud and deception or we have major substantive changes in the
law. We can pretend we are helping the consumer by offering him an Office
for Consumers with no real powers and a cause of action strangled with crip-
pling devices or we can create meaningful solutions to long-standing problems.
We confront a question of purpose. Are we interested in short-term, political
gain built upon elaborate but empty proposals? Or are we interested in granting
the hard-pressed consumer his day in court and his voice in the decision-making
process? There are only two types of proposals now pending in the Senate -
those that will be effective and those that are drafted to be ineffective.
If the Senate will not do something for the consumer, I hope the consumer
will elect those who will.
38 S. 3240, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 301 (1969).
39 Id.
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